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OPINION OF THE COURT 
           
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 Courtney Dave Pennycooke appeals from the judgment of 
conviction and sentence in this criminal case entered on October 
20, 1994, following his conviction and sentencing on both counts 
of a two-count indictment.  Count 1 charged him with conspiracy 
to distribute in excess of 50 grams of cocaine base, or crack, 
and in excess of 500 grams of cocaine, and Count 2 charged him 
with distributing and possessing with intent to distribute in 
excess of 50 grams of crack.  The court sentenced Pennycooke to 
concurrent 13-year terms of imprisonment to be followed by 
concurrent five-year terms of supervised release. 
 Pennycooke advances two grounds for reversal.  First, 
he argues that the district court erred in failing to advise him 
of his right to testify at trial and in failing to elicit an on-
the-record waiver of that right from him.  Second, he contends 
that the district court's jury instructions were defective as 
they did not include a definition of multiple conspiracies.  We 
conclude that his argument for reversal on the second basis is 
clearly without merit and thus we confine our discussion to his 
first point over which we will exercise plenary review.  United 
States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1397 (3d Cir. 1994).  The 
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district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and we 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 Pennycooke argues that because the court did not engage 
him directly in an on-the-record colloquy regarding his right to 
testify or not to testify his constitutional rights were 
violated.  He emphasizes that he "is uneducated in the ways of 
the law," and it thus would be "unfair to assume that [he] would 
have any idea that his counsel had waived his most precious right 
to testify without so much as a consultation on the record with 
him or an announcement on-the-record to the court and the jury." 
Br. at 10.  Pennycooke also insists that any recourse he might 
have in pursuing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for 
the alleged usurpation of his right to testify would be 
inadequate.  The prosecution, though disputing Pennycooke's legal 
argument, does not contend that the court directly advised him 
that he had a constitutional right to testify. 
 It is well established that the right of a defendant to 
testify on his or her behalf at his or her own criminal trial is 
rooted in the Constitution.  Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49-
53, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 2708-10 (1987).  This right is personal and 
thus only the defendant may waive it.  See Jones v. Barnes, 463 
U.S. 745, 751, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 3312 (1983) ("the accused has the 
ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions 
regarding the case, as to whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, 
testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal"); United 
States v. Joelson, 7 F.3d 174, 177 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 
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S.Ct. 620 (1993); United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1531-33 
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 127 (1992); Ortega v. 
O'Leary, 843 F.2d 258, 261 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 
841, 109 S.Ct. 110 (1988).  As a constitutional right "'essential 
to due process of law in a fair adversary process,'" Rock v. 
Arkansas, 483 U.S. at 51, 107 S.Ct. at 2709 (quoting Faretta v. 
California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n.15, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2533 n.15 
(1975)), a defendant's waiver of the right to testify must be 
knowing and intelligent.  See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 
218, 241, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2055 (1973). 
 Nevertheless, other courts of appeals consistently have 
held that a trial court has no duty to explain to the defendant 
that he or she has a right to testify or to verify that the 
defendant who is not testifying has waived that right 
voluntarily.  See, e.g., United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d at 
1533 n.8; United States v. Edwards, 897 F.2d 445, 447 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1000, 111 S.Ct. 560 (1990); United States 
v. Martinez, 883 F.2d 750, 756-60 (9th Cir. 1989), vacated on 
other grounds, 928 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1991); Ortega v. O'Leary, 
843 F.2d at 261; Siciliano v. Vose, 834 F.2d 29, 30 (1st Cir. 
1987); United States v. Bernloehr, 833 F.2d 749, 752 (8th Cir. 
1987); United States v. Janoe, 720 F.2d 1156, 1161 (10th Cir. 
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1036, 104 S.Ct. 1310 (1984).  We 
now join those courts. 
 The right to testify qualitatively differs from those 
constitutional rights which can be waived only after the court 
inquires into the validity of the waiver.  In anchoring the 
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accused's right to testify to the Constitution, the Supreme Court 
in Rock v. Arkansas described it as "a necessary corollary to the 
Fifth Amendment's guarantee against compelled testimony," 483 
U.S. at 52, 107 S.Ct. at 2709.  Exercise of either the right to 
testify or the right not to testify necessarily would waive the 
other right.  Thus, a trial court's advice as to the right to 
testify "could inappropriately influence the defendant to waive 
his [or her] constitutional right not to testify, thus 
threatening the exercise of this other, converse, 
constitutionally explicit, and more fragile right."  Siciliano, 
834 F.2d at 30; Martinez, 883 F.2d at 757, 760; United States v. 
Campione, 942 F.2d 429, 439 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 The fact that a criminal defendant, depending on the 
facts and circumstances of the case, reasonably could choose 
either to testify or not to testify, necessarily means the 
determination of whether the defendant will testify is an 
important part of trial strategy best left to the defendant and 
counsel without the intrusion of the trial court, as that 
intrusion may have the unintended effect of swaying the defendant 
one way or the other.  See, e.g., Martinez, 883 F.2d at 757, 760; 
Teague, 953 F.2d at 1533 n.8; Campione, 942 F.2d at 439.  For 
example, as a matter of strategy and common sense, the defendant 
and counsel may wait until well into the trial before deciding 
whether the defendant will testify.  Thus, the trial court may 
not know that the defendant will not testify until the defense 
rests.  A colloquy on the right to testify at that point not only 
would be awkward, see Martinez, 883 F.2d at 760 (citing 
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Commonwealth v. Hennessey, 502 N.E.2d 943, 947 (Mass. App. Ct.), 
review denied, 504 N.E.2d 1066 (Mass. 1987)), but more 
importantly inadvertently might cause the defendant to think that 
the court believes the defense has been insufficient.  This 
belief in turn might prompt the defendant to abandon an 
appropriate defense strategy without good reason.  See State v. 
Albright, 291 N.W.2d 487, 493 (Wis. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 
957, 101 S.Ct. 367 (1980) ("Such admonition is subject to abuse 
in interpretation and may provoke substantial judicial 
participation that could frustrate a thoughtfully considered 
decision by the defendant and counsel who are designing trial 
strategy.").  Thus, as a general matter, we believe that it is 
inadvisable for a court to question a defendant directly about 
his or her waiver of the right to testify. 
 Pennycooke nevertheless urges us not to infer from an 
unclear record that he waived his right to testify.  He relies on 
the dissenting opinions in Martinez and Teague for the position 
that such personal, fundamental rights cannot be presumed from 
silence to have been waived.  In both cases, the dissenting 
opinions relied on an analogy to the right to counsel, which the 
Supreme Court requires to be waived on the record.  Teague, 953 
F.2d at 1542 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 
1019 (1938); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 82 S.Ct. 884 
(1962)); Martinez, 883 F.2d at 767 (same).  We, however, like the 
majority opinion in Martinez, find the analogy unpersuasive when 
a defendant appears in court with an attorney.  Martinez, 883 
F.2d at 757.  See also United States ex rel. Soto v. United 
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States, 504 F.2d 1339, 1344 n.16 (3d Cir. 1974) (court need not 
advise defendant sua sponte of right to proceed pro se).1  After 
all, the colloquy required to waive the right to counsel is 
important precisely because the defendant is waiving the right 
when unrepresented.  In the right to testify cases, however, the 
defendant is represented by counsel throughout the trial, and the 
court is entitled to -- indeed should -- presume that the 
attorney and the client have discussed that right.2 
 Further, because of the importance of the right to 
counsel, courts presume that a rational defendant will choose to 
be represented by counsel.  See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 796 (1963) ("[T]here are few defendants 
charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers 
they can get to prepare and present their defenses.").  That 
presumption -- that defendants with competent counsel are better 
off than those without -- lies, in fact, at the heart of the 
right to counsel in the first place.  Id. ("[P]recedents [and] 
reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our 
adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into 
court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair 
trial unless counsel is provided for him.").  That makes it 
especially important for the court to ensure that a waiver of the 
                     
1Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, overruled 
the Soto holding that a defendant does not have a constitutional 
right to proceed pro se but it did not disturb Soto to the extent 
that the Soto court indicated that even if the defendant did have 
that right the district court was not obliged to advise him or 
her of it. 
2We are not addressing the situation in which a defendant is pro 
se as Pennycooke was represented by counsel. 
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right is made knowingly and competently.  Such a policy, of 
course, does not apply with respect to the right to testify, 
however, as we cannot say that a rational defendant will, other 
things being equal, choose to testify.  Indeed, a defendant when 
testifying necessarily waives the right not to testify, but the 
trial court is not required to elicit an on-the-record, knowing 
and intelligent waiver of that right.  Martinez, 883 F.2d at 756-
57.  We therefore hold that usually a court need not advise a 
defendant either directly or through a colloquy with counsel of 
his or her right to testify. 
 Nevertheless in exceptional, narrowly defined 
circumstances, judicial interjection through a direct colloquy 
with the defendant may be required to ensure that the defendant's 
right to testify is protected.  For example, in Ortega v. 
O'Leary, 843 F.2d 258, the defendant repeatedly interrupted the 
trial to express his desire to testify.  The trial court 
questioned his attorney about the defendant's statements and the 
attorney indicated that he and the defendant made a joint 
decision that the defendant would not testify.  Despite the 
defendant's interjection that his attorney was lying, the trial 
court did not inquire further and denied the defendant's 
continuing requests to testify.  The Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit, on a habeas corpus appeal, found error in this 
procedure.3  The court emphasized that the right to testify is 
                     
3The Ortega court nevertheless denied petitioner's writ of habeas 
corpus, finding that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Ortega, 843 F.2d at 262-63. 
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personal to the defendant and thus neither may be waived by 
counsel nor denied by the trial court.  Ortega, 843 F.2d at 261. 
Although the court recognized that while trial courts "have no 
affirmative duty to determine whether a defendant's silence is 
the result of a knowing and voluntary decision not to testify," 
they "must take steps to insure that important constitutional 
rights have been voluntarily and intelligently waived."  Id. 
Thus, the court cautioned trial courts to "carefully consider a 
defendant's request to exercise his or her constitutional rights, 
particularly the right to testify."  Id.  Where, in furtherance 
of trial strategy, defense counsel nullifies a defendant's right 
to testify over the defendant's protest, the defendant clearly 
has been denied the right to testify.  In such a case, it may be 
advisable that the trial court inquire discreetly into the 
disagreement and ensure that constitutional rights are not 
suppressed wrongly. 
 But that situation is the exception, not the rule. 
Where the trial court has no reason to believe that the 
defendant's own attorney is frustrating his or her desire to 
testify, a trial court has no affirmative duty to advise the 
defendant of the right to testify or to obtain an on-the-record 
waiver of such right.  The duty of providing such advice and of 
ensuring that any waiver is knowing and intelligent rests with 
defense counsel.  Here, we have no reason to depart from the 
usual rule and we therefore hold that the district court did not 
err in not advising Pennycooke of his right to testify and in not 
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obtaining from Pennycooke an on-the-record waiver.  See United 
States v. Bernloehr, 833 F.2d at 752. 
 In reaching our result, we realize that a convicted 
defendant may assert a claim that the trial attorney gave 
ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984), by failing to advise the defendant of 
his or her right to testify.  Pennycooke, however, points to 
nothing in the record to support a conclusion that his attorney 
did not advise him of his right to testify.  Instead he merely 
requests that if we reject his contention that the court should 
have advised him of his right to testify that we "remand this 
matter to the district court for an evidentiary hearing as to 
whether or not [his] right to testify was impermissibly waived by 
counsel."  Brief at 14.  We, however, will not remand the matter 
as Pennycooke requests, for if he wishes to charge his counsel 
with being ineffective, he must raise the issue in a proceeding 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  See United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 
300, 311-12 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1089, 110 
S.Ct. 1831 (1990). 
  
III.  CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of conviction and sentence entered on October 20, 1994. 
